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Despite significant upgrading of bank regulations and supervisory capacity and expertise, 
there has been little evident improvement in bank failure experience worldwide over the 
past decade.  In addition, cross-country evidence suggests that systems that are over-
regulated by discretionary official supervisors – ostensibly in the interests of prudence – 
underperform along a number of dimensions.  Perhaps most interestingly, an approach 
based on strengthening official supervision was found at best to have no significant effect 
on the development of the financial sector; at worst, except in the most institutionally 
advanced countries, the effect went the other way (increased supervisory powers 
associated with less financial sector development).   Instead, evidence from a cross-
country survey suggests that banking systems work better where market discipline is 
fostered by strict accounting and auditing rules, use of international rating agencies by 
banks, and avoidance of deposit insurance (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2003). 
 
But how much reliance can one place on market forces where the liquidity, transparency 
and other underlying characteristics of markets are deficient?  Specifically, which 
elements of market discipline work better in immature environments?  Most practitioners 
think that, as markets plainly do not function well in low-income countries, then it must 
be the case that market discipline also does not work, and that therefore these countries 
need to rely more heavily on capital and bank supervision, the two pillars stressed in the 
approach of the Basel Committee. Is this presumption correct? 
 
This paper reviews the different channels of market discipline, discussing how they work, 
what the policy and institutional prerequisites are, and outlining existing empirical 
evidence.  New data on the changing degree to which these pre-requisites are in place are 
presented.  Using this data and proxies for the degree of banking vulnerability, we will 
provide some evidence on the presence of prerequisites for the different flavors in 
different countries and on their possible effectiveness.  However market discipline does 
function, empirical evidence indicates that it does a better job compared with reliance 
unofficial supervision.  While attempts to improve the latter no doubt should and will 
continue, there is much to be said in favor of building on strengths.  Accordingly, the last 
section of the paper addresses policy considerations regarding what can be done to 
improve the functioning of market discipline. 
 
To summarize our findings, there is no systematic tendency for low-income countries to 
lack the pre-requisites for market discipline. Offsetting factors to the weaker market and 
formal information infrastructures are (i) the less complex character of banking business 
in low-income countries; (ii) the growing internationalization of these markets through 
the presence of foreign banks, and through international trading of the debt and equity of 
locally-controlled non-government banks; and (iii) the smaller size of the business and 
financial community.  On the other hand, continuing dominance by public sector banks in 
some countries limits the likely development of market monitoring, clearly a cause for 
concern, given the disappointing record of governments around the world as monitors of 
their self-owned banks. 
    2
Among the different channels of market discipline, low-income countries are best 
positioned to exploit depositor discipline if the government avoids the chilling effects of 
blanket guarantees and the like.  Because depositor discipline is effectively in the hands 
of a small number of large depositors, the information requirements for depositor 
discipline may be more easily satisfied in an economy where the financial and business 
elite is small, as it is in many of the lower-income countries.   
 
Though local institutional deficiencies can appear to be a limiting factor, the effectiveness 
of discipline through debt and equity markets in low income countries is enhanced by the 
increasing tendency for privately controlled banks in developing countries to make their 
equity available for depository receipt (DR) trading on international markets, and to issue 
internationally traded debt.  The use of information intermediaries (accounting firms and 
rating agencies) is also growing rapidly in low income countries, but their independent 
ability to contribute to market discipline seems rather limited given the heightened 
conflicts of interest in small business communities and the modest resources that are 
typically devoted to ratings. 
 
Although market monitoring appears to be better developed in low-income countries, 
relative perhaps to expectations, it still is the case that more can and should be done to 
strengthen it.  Although we find some evidence that countries where there is greater scope 
for local monitoring (because their banking systems are not predominantly government-
owned or foreign-owned) do employ policies friendly to market discipline, it is of some 
concern that there has been some drop overall in the use of such policies overall.  
Importantly, we do not suggest that current or prospective levels of market monitoring 
would be sufficient to protect small developing countries from banking crises, as these 
results in part from the greater nominal, real, and financial volatility that these economies 
suffer (World Bank, 2001).  However, we do think that strengthening market monitoring 
will help both in limiting the cost of crises and in reducing the likelihood of crises that 
originate from within the banking sector. 
 
 
II.  Market Monitors: The Players and the Issues 
 
Depositors, debt holders, outside equity holders, and information specialists (e.g. rating 
agencies and independent auditors) all have a potential role to play, but to differing 
degrees in different countries, depending for example on the level of financial 
development and on the international openness.
1   While there is a considerable overlap 
between the mechanisms involved, each of these classes of agent exercises discipline in 
contrasting ways.  It is the distinctive characteristic of depositors that they will withdraw 
their funds in response to a shift in risk, whereas it is the prices of traded bonds that will 
                                                 
1 Another dimension sometimes mentioned as part of market discipline is reliance on banks’ internal risk 
evaluations rather than on the views of supervisors, or simple mechanical rules linking provisioning and 
capital requirements with objective characteristics of the loan portfolio and other dimensions of the banks.  
Here it is the internal evaluations of the bank – admittedly a market entity – that are being employed rather 
than the rest of the market external to each bank.  It seems to stretch the definition a bit wide to include this 
dimension.  Even if they are they part of the market discipline story, they are still largely irrelevant for 
almost all developing countries.   3
fall if a bank becomes distressed.  Equity holders are sensitive to the potential for upside 
as well as downside.  Large depositors, bondholders and outside equity holders, while 
they may be few, are potentially many.  In contrast, approved rating agencies, and to a 
lesser extent auditing firms, are typically a small and relatively closed group. 
 
For economies with advanced financial systems the argument for market discipline is 
especially one driven by the increased complexity of finance.  In these economies 
(according to research findings) neither regulators nor the market have the monopoly of 
wisdom.
2  Market forces can help improve discipline in the banking system by helping to 
monitor the conduct and condition of the banks (Flannery, 2001).  The complexity 
argument is also relevant for developing countries: even if their financial systems are 
simpler, nevertheless supervisory capacity is also more limited and the relative 
effectiveness of risk-assessment by supervisors may be weaker.  If so, having market 
participants help in the monitoring function is even more important.   
 
But market discipline goes beyond monitoring and turns it into discipline by bringing 
influence to bear directly or indirectly on bank behavior.  The direct influence come by 
altering the incentives for bank insiders, especially by increasing the cost of their funding.  
Even in the US, however, the indications are that such direct incentive effects are not 
sufficient to fully correct for excessive risk-taking (Bliss and Flannery, 2001).  The 
indirect mechanism comes by the way in which market behavior serves to signal the 
results of monitoring to official regulators through its effect on asset prices or flows.  The 
supervisors can then take supplementary action to influence bank behavior, for example 
through direct action to restrain bank behavior, or by an increase in risk-dependent 
deposit insurance premia, for example.   
 
Note that the indirect signaling mechanism needs to be complemented by effective 
official intervention, whereas the direct incentive mechanism is more self-policing.  More 
subtly, market participants who are placed at risk can, through political or 
macroeconomic mechanisms, also influence the policy environment, including the rigor 
with which regulations are enforced.  The more transparent and conspicuous the market 
signal, the less scope the supervisor will have for covert forbearance. 
 
Both the monitoring and influence ability of both the market and the official supervisor 
may depend on national institutional characteristics, but it is unclear how rapid these 





                                                 
2 Interestingly, US studies which employ information on the timing of bank examiner downgrades show 
that equity prices have tended to fall (Berger, Davies & Flannery, 2000) following examiner downgrades 
but spreads on subordinated debt narrow some quarters after downgrades (De Young, Flannery, Lang and 
Sorescu, 2001).  The findings can be reconciled by assuming that shortly after the downgrade, the market 
discovers not only that (i) losses have been incurred (bad for equities) but (ii) corrective action is being 
taken (good for bond holders).   4
 
A.  The role of large depositors 
 
The mechanism 
The simplicity of the mechanism of depositor discipline is deceptive. Large depositors 
may inform themselves about the condition of a bank, but will also be highly sensitive to 
any increase in risk because of the nature of the deposit contract.  There can be no upside 
gain on an existing deposit, so withdrawal is the optimal strategy in case of an increase in 
the perceived risk.  (This is in contrast to a bond, which an existing holder must sell on 
the market, thereby incurring a capital loss: the bond’s price falls to the point where 
demand is sufficient to clear the market).  This feature of the deposit contract both keeps 
banks on their toes (Calomiris and Kahn), and creates the risk of a contagious bank run 
(Diamond and Dybvig).  Indeed the perceived risk of instability associated with the 
contagious run has often been invoked to justify safety net intervention, which would 
serve to reduce the risk sensitivity of depositors.   
 
In addition to the threat of withdrawals in response to an increase in risk, which is the 
distinctive characteristic of the depositor discipline, there is the additional effect in 
equilibrium that banks will have to offer the marginal depositor a sufficient rate of return 
to compensate for risk (in addition to convenience factors and other characteristics of the 
deposit variations in which may often be much more important than default risk) (cf. 
Hannan and Hanweck, 1988).  If all depositors share the same information, one can 
imagine a pure price effect, with no change in the volume of deposits.  On the other hand, 
as noted by Park and Peristiani, if there are differences of opinion among depositors as to 
the risk being taken, a change in risk could lead to a new equilibrium with lower deposits 
and a higher interest rate. 
 
Political economy 
Removing or downgrading the safety net, thereby allowing this mechanism to function, is 
usually politically problematic.  Even if there is a ceiling to formal deposit insurance, the 
blanket extension in practice of deposit insurance whenever there is a systemic crisis, and 
the active use of a lender of last resort facility, both serve to insulate, albeit partially, the 
depositors from the consequences of risky behavior.  This insulation is likely to be higher 
where governments have some degree of credibility.  It is at the lowest levels of 
government credibility that the depositors may feel themselves exposed to bank risk. 
 
Market pre-requisites 
Unlike the situation with the other three agencies of market discipline, bank depositors 
are present in all countries.  Accordingly, at a certain level, aside from the usual concerns 
about possible free-riding, the market pre-requisites for this mechanism are always 
present.  It is the availability and perceived likelihood of bail-outs that undermines the 
effectiveness of these markets.  A key factor in assessing the likely effectiveness of 
depositor monitoring is the nature of the information environment.  In most developing 
countries, economic power and wealth are concentrated within a relatively small business 
elite and it seems reasonable to draw parallels with other small business communities 
such as those in which depositor discipline is thought to have worked well, such as the   5
extensively documented cases of 18
th Century Scotland and early 19
th Century New 
England (Kroszner, 1997; Lamoreaux, 1994).  
 
Evidence 
There is a growing body of evidence (since Baer and Brewer, 1986) on the negative 
correlation between various indicators of bank quality and interest rate paid for deposits 
and a positive correlation with deposit growth.   
 
The major route for depositor discipline is through withdrawal. Probably the biggest 
episode of deposit withdrawals in recent times was the loss of one-fifth of the deposit 
base in the Tequila crisis of 1994-5 in Argentina.  Calomiris and Powell (2001) cite 
evidence that it was the banks that were objectively weaker and those which subsequently 
proved to be insolvent that were the subject of the most severe withdrawals, suggesting 
that this form of depositor discipline can be a discriminating one, and is not necessarily 
caught up in a contagious race for all exits, even in such a systemically grave crisis (see 
also D’Amato, Grubisic, and Powell, 1997). 
 
Withdrawal can also be permanent.  If informed large depositors remain persistently 
dubious about the quality of bank governance, then they will stay away – even placing 
their funds outside the country.
 3 
 
Depositors do seem to demand higher returns from risky banks.  Although many of the 
earlier US studies found little relation between measures of bank risk and interest rates, 
suggesting that there was perhaps more of an expectation of regulatory bailout in earlier 
times, the relationship is more recently clearly evident in the data (cf. park and 
Peristiani).  For developing countries too there is a growing body of evidence that bank 
risk is evident in interest rates: Barajas and Steiner (2000) provide evidence for 
Colombia; Davies and Robitaille (1997) for Chile; Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001) 
for Argentina, Chile and  Mexico; Mondschean and Opiela (1999) for Poland; Opiela 
(2001) for Thailand.   Moreover, the extensive cross country study of Demirgűç-Kunt and 
Huizinga (2004) showed that in the absence of explicit deposit insurance, banks growing 
their portfolios rapidly had to pay an increasing cost for their funding.   
 
The discovery by Martinez Peria and Schmukler that banks with a higher share of non-
performing loans (seen as a measure of risk) seem to lose share in the deposit market and 
to pay an interest rate premium even in the presence of deposit insurance, has been 
interpreted as implying that deposit insurance is more credible in some countries than in 
others (Chile more credible than Argentina
4).  But it also alerts us to the need to hunt for 
alternative and supplementary reasons (other than risk) for differences  between the 
interest rates paid by different banks. 
 
                                                 
3 The low money-to-GDP ratios (even conditional on inflation) in Sub-Saharan Africa, a low income region 
which has experienced above average incidence of depositor losses in banking crises, can be taken as 
indirect evidence of this. 
4 They find that a bank’s ratio of insured to uninsured depositors is risk-sensitive in Chile, but not in 
Argentina, suggesting that the Argentine deposit insurance system lacked credibility.   6
Note, however, that several of these studies use average interest cost of funds in lieu of 
marginal interest rates paid.  To the extent that banks with a large retail branch network, 
or those with heavy reliance on checking deposits, likely source their funds at lower 
average interest costs, though paying the same wholesale marginal interest rates as the 
rest of the market, this could introduce systematic bias. Wholesale banks will, for 
example, tend to have a lower percentage of their deposits covered by insurance and also 
be paying a higher average interest cost of funds, but these two facts will be wholly 
unrelated.  There has to be some doubt as to whether, in such circumstances, the research 
is cleanly extracting bank confidence effects.
5  
 
Is the direct influence effect of informed depositor behavior sufficient to ensure efficient 
risk decisions by the bankers?  Even in advanced economies, the cost penalty imposed on 
risky banks by sophisticated depositors is small – too small, it seems, to accomplish a 
sizable alteration in the risk-preference of the bank insiders (Park and Peristiani).  
 
This does not take account of the depositor run mechanism with which we began this 
section.  No quantitative empirical evidence has been adduced on this mechanism, despite 
the fact that it is likely to be a much more effective direct form of discipline than the 
small interest differentials observed. 
 
To the extent that the behavior of depositors results in only a small interest differential,  
the most important aspect of depositors influence must be on the policy environment and 
this can be relevant even in countries with weak governance structures.  In open 
economies where sophisticated depositors perceive too much risk-taking, they may 
already have moved most of their funds abroad, thereby lowering the marginal response 
of deposit rates or flows to changes in bank risk.  
 
B. Subordinated  debt 
 
The mechanism 
In addition to insisting on a minimum buffer of capital adequacy, it has been suggested 
(Calomiris, 1999a,b, see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1999) that 
banks should be required to issue a certain amount – for example a given fraction of total 
assets – of subordinated debt.  The bank’s inability to do this, or the level of the yield it is 
required to pay, will signal its riskiness to the regulator as well as increasing the cost of a 
risky bank’s operations.   
 
This ingenious suggestion that subordinated debt should be used as a market-discipline 
device is one that has been widely misunderstood.  Indeed, inasmuch as the voluntary 
issuance of sub debt is often seen by bank insiders as a cheap and stable source of 
                                                 
5 Some authors doubt whether risky banks could logically face higher interest rates in a market where a 
credible deposit insurance scheme is present.  Thus, Billet et al (1998) for the US argued that banks could 
substitute insured deposits for uninsured if the latter started to cost more because of risk effects. But 
Morgan and Stiroh argue that banks face an upward-sloping supply of insured deposits because of limited 
capacity of the local area—likely relevant for developing countries also—and in that case (except for a 
corner solution) the risky-yield on bonds is still the marginal cost of funds.   7
funding and of meeting capital requirements, it might seem implausible that sub debt 
could be at the heart of a market discipline system.  In fact, however, the proposal, in its 
most promising forms, is a more subtle and complex one than is often represented, and 
involves certain restrictions that greatly enhance the disciplining function.  For one thing, 
to satisfy the requirements of the scheme, qualifying sub debt must be held by 
independent institutional investors and not either by insiders or by the retail public.  This 
restriction on holders is intended to ensure that the holders have the capacity and 
motivation to inform themselves about the condition of the bank in that their investments 
will effectively be like a “canary in the coal-mine,” losing their value before the deposit 
insurer incurs a loss.  The second important restriction (not imposed in the Argentine 
case) is that the yield on qualifying bonds must not exceed a certain level (measured 
against current money-market yields).  This ensures that the sub-debt does not simply 
become a junk bond yielding a sufficiently high coupon to compensate for even a high 
risk of default, thereby weakening the investors’ incentive to assess that risk carefully.  
By imposing this interest ceiling, albeit on a limited class of liabilities, the scheme 




The political economy of the sub debt requirement is also somewhat promising.  Losses 
incurred by institutional investors from the holding of a bond explicitly designed as an 
early warning mechanism and explicitly subordinated is unlikely to be the subject of 
successful lobbying for compensation by the investor.  Nor should there be any likelihood 
of a spillover effect into the insolvency of the institutional investor inasmuch as the 
investor’s holdings of such bonds would be transparent and as such kept within 
affordable bounds.  Besides, if the investor were a foreign institution, as would be highly 
desirable, the loss would be exported. 
 
On the other hand, holding the license of a local bank hostage to its ability to raise funds 
from possibly foreign institutions through subordinated debt at low interest may not be 
politically sustainable.  Owners of small banks are typically a powerful political lobby. 
While such pressure can perhaps be resisted if it is a question of an isolated bank for 
which the preumption is that it really is in trouble, such pressure could be less easy to 
resist at the start-up phase of such a scheme (as indeed was the case in Argentina). In that 
case too, banks collectively may complain that their cost of funding is greatly increased 
and that they are placed at a competitive disadvantage. 
 
Market requirements 
It is sometimes asserted that requiring the issue of sub debt is infeasible in developing 
economies because of the lack of the relevant markets (Karacadag and Shrivastava, 
2000).  But this overstates the problem of market thinness.  It is true that, even in 
advanced European economies, secondary markets for subordinated bank debt are very 
thin (Sironi, 2000, 2001a, b).  But active secondary trading of these instruments is not 
necessary for the scheme to function.  By requiring short maturities, the authorities can 
ensure that each bank is required to tap the primary issue market sufficiently frequently to 
ensure a regular flow of market information and discipline from the scheme.  Indeed, in   8
the case of Argentina, the primary market functioned well enough that the weakest banks 
were not able to issue.  Covitz, Hancock, and Kwast (2003) show that in the United States 
as well, riskier banks were less likely to issue subordinated debt than their safer 
counterparts.
6  Still, it is true that even the primary market may be difficult to establish at 
first, especially when all of the banks are seeking such funding, and that the issue of debt 
to foreign institutions could entail significant costs.  
 
Administrative requirements 
In some dimensions, the sub debt requirement scheme calls for very little administrative 
capacity.  Thus, there is no need to assess the condition of the bank: all that is required in 
this dimension is to know the total assets or whatever the chosen the key for the sub debt 
requirement may be.  The regulatory authorities do however need to verify two important 
and interlinked aspects: is the investor truly an independent and potentially well-informed 
institution, and has the risk been hedged by the investor through some form of explicit or 
implicit put back to the inside shareholders of the bank.  It may not always be easy for the 
regulatory authorities in developing economies to verify such matters, though they are 
less likely to be a problem if qualifying investors are restricted to reputable international 
banks or institutional investors. 
 
Empirical experience on the magnitude of effect 
Listed subordinated bonds also have some signaling effect, and are responsive to risk in 
advanced economies (Evanoff and Wall, 2001, Morgan and Stiroh 1999, 2001, Sironi, 
2000, 20001a, b).  But, even in advanced systems, bond markets are thin and illiquid and 
the price uncertainty tends to swamp the signal.  Nevertheless, proposals for mandatory 
issues of subordinated debt to reputable external buyers do not depend on the presence of 
an active secondary market: employing short-term debt that needs to be rolled-over on a 
regular basis can be an adequate substitute. 
 
Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes (2002) have examined the predictive ability of bank bond 
spreads in Europe, using downgrades to C or below as a proxy for “failure” since few 
banks actually fail in Europe; even though their study employs the rating agencies’ 
“support ratings” as an indication of the degree to which a bank is considered “too big to 
fail,” they find predictive power for the bond spreads only in the case of the UK. 
 
There has been limited experience with mandatory subordinated debt to date – the 
Argentine experiment being effectively the only case and as that system came under the 
pressure that ended with the default of 2001, there was extensive forbearance on the 
requirement.  The presence of subordinated debt on banks’ books in other countries can, 
nevertheless be somewhat informative about potential features of their use (see Box on 
Lebanon). 
 
                                                 
6 Importantly, they note that this creates a significant problem for researchers who are using secondary 
market spreads to test for market discipline; the absence of any evidence does not mean that the market is 
not exerting discipline, but rather that it already has, by preventing or discouraging weaker banks from 
issuing paper in first place.   9
C.  Potential role of equity markets for disciplining banks 
 
The mechanism 
Equity markets also monitor and directly discipline the insiders at listed banks.
7  If the 
insiders are looting, or taking higher risks, this could show in the price of equity, directly 
affecting the wealth of the insiders and their ability to raise future capital, though not 
necessarily feeding through to interest rates demanded by depositors or bondholders.  
Unlike the situation for deposits, there is room for difference of opinion among informed 
investors: the pessimists will sell to the optimists.  Shifts in the holding of informed 
insiders can also be informative though they are normally publicly disclosed and as such 
may in turn pass-through to the market price.  A shortcoming of the equity price as a 
signal is that it prices-in both upside and downside prospects.  An increase in the risk of 
failure may not lower equilibrium equity prices if it is also accompanied by some 
increased probability of higher return.  Indeed, an increase in risk that is compensated by 
an increase in expected return will see equity prices rise rather than fall, provided the 
outside shareholders are confident that they will share proportionally in the gain and not 
be exploited by the insiders. 
 
Bank equity can be seen as embodying the likely future value of the firms plus a put 
option at zero price.  If the assumptions underlying standard option price theory are valid 
for the equity price, it is possible to invert such formulas, using information about, for 
example, the variance of equity prices, to arrive at a probability of default (cf. Laeven 
2002).  This is, in effect, a refinement of simpler “distance-to-default” measures, which 
compare equity prices to their standard deviation.   
 
Political economy 
Outside equity holders are less likely to be bailed out than any other category of 
stakeholder in a failing bank. Insiders, with their ability to spoil smooth intervention 
operations, are more likely to be insulated in such circumstances.  This heightens the 
sensitivity of outside equity holders to information about the banks’ prospects and 




But bank shares need to be listed if their market price is to be readily available.  More and 
more banks are listed, and this can be the case even for some majority state-owned or  
foreign-owned banks.  The effectiveness of the price discovery process is variable 
                                                 
7 Saunders, 2001 even suggests that debt and equity market prices can theoretically provide equivalent 
information about the riskiness of a bank and that the equity market is in practice probably more effective, 
since the secondary debt market is thin – just a few players even in the United States – and probably not 
very efficient at pricing.  This may be an extreme view, oversimplifying the problem of inferring the 
default probability from equity prices – arguably trickier (and requiring more additional information or 
assumptions) than doing so from the price of debt.  In his comparison of equity and subordinated debt as 
mechanisms for providing market discipline, Saunders may be unduly neglecting the independence 
requirement of the sub debt schemes and the problem of insider looting if equity is closely held.  But his 
observation that insiders at small banks may be self-serving in favoring mandatory debt issues over dilution 
of their equity is an astute one.   10
depending, for example, on the openness of the stock market to international flows, and 
on whether the equities are cross-listed on a mature exchange.   
 
Empirical evidence 
The potential signaling role of equity prices is important and undervalued, even in 
relatively undeveloped markets.  Thus for example, the “distance-to-default” measured 
from market prices of the equity of Thai banks predicted their difficulties in 1997 well 
before rating agency downgrades.
8  The potential of equity prices to signal risk of failure 
before the East Asia crisis is also well illustrated by the synthetic exercise conducted by 
Bongini, Laeven and Majnoni (2002) who showed the superior forecasting ability of 
probability of default computed from an equity-price based option price model, not only 




Even if outside equity holders are unable to directly influence the decisions of insiders, 
movements in market prices do make recapitalization more costly for the insiders and 
represent a very transparent signal (Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes, 2002).  Interestingly, 
evidence from Europe suggests that bank equity prices respond much more reliably to 
rating agency downgrades than do their bond prices (Gropp and Richards, 2001), perhaps 
due to a perception that the relevant banks—most of them large—are too big to fail and 
that bondholders are therefore unconcerned about risk.  In the US, the indications are that 
bond and equity returns on bank holding companies usually co-move – the companies are 
not sufficiently near insolvency for interests of bond holders and equity holders to 
diverge much – except sometimes and these observations are, of course, of especial 
interest (Bliss and Flannery, 2001). 
 
D. Specialized  information  firms 
 
The mechanism 
Auditors and rating agencies are the most relevant of the small group of specialist 
information firms assessing the condition of banks.  Their incentives are not directly 
linked to the future value of the banks’ securities, but instead depend on their reputation 
and accreditation, which are the source of their continuing profitability.  Reputation arises 
because, regardless of who actually pays, the demand for the services of such firms 
depends on the degree to which they are perceived as trustworthy and reliable by the 
major users of the information they provide: equity and bond investors respectively. Both 
have long been used for regulatory purposes in the US (but not in most other advanced 
economies) with their usefulness in this role depending on their ability to retain the 
confidence of the regulator.  There is clearly a rental or surplus involved in this 
regulatory usage, which can be lost if the raters become too generous in their ratings or 
when auditors acquiesce in over-optimistic accounts.  In the developing country context 
                                                 
8Using the KMV methodology to compute default probabilities from equity price movements it can be 
shown that the debt of several Thai banks were at junk-bond levels at a time in 1997 while the rating 
agencies were still treating them as investment-grade (Saunders, 2001). 
9 Note however that equity-based risk measures are not correlated with bank deposit interest premiums 
(Opiela, 2001).   11
however, the business model of the international ratings companies relies on global 
reputation rather than any regulatory requirements.  Traditionally, auditors were chiefly 
responsible to the shareholders (especially in common law countries), though law may 




Because rating of banks is typically conducted by international firms, the process can be 
thought of as largely independent of national political pressures in the host country.  It 
would be a different matter if rating agencies were brought in formally to the regulatory 
process inasmuch as they would require accreditation, which could suck them into 
compliance with political pressures. Auditing firms are usually accredited through a self-
regulatory process, though there is a recent trend toward official regulation in several 
countries following recent US accounting scandals. 
  
Table 1:  Number of banks rated by Fitch in each developing country 
(October 2003) 
Sub-Saharan Africa East  Asia Middle East 
Benin  1  China 16     & North Africa 
Kenya   4  Indonesia   14  Egypt   9 
South Africa   16  Malaysia   11  Jordan   3 
  Philippines   14  Lebanon   5 
Eastern Europe  Thailand   19  Morocco   5 
    & Central Asia  Viet Nam   7  Oman   3 
Azerbaijan   1    Pakistan   5 
Belarus   1  Latin America Saudi Arabia   9 
Bulgaria   2  & The Caribbean Tunisia   15 
Croatia   4  Argentina   6  Turkey   29 
Czech Republic   4  Bolivia   1   
Estonia  2  Brazil   50  South Asia
Georgia   1  Chile   5  Bangladesh  5 
Hungary   8  Colombia   5  India   34 
Kazakstan   7  Dominican Rep.   5  Sri Lanka   5 
Latvia   5  Ecuador   2   
Poland  12  El Salvador   5   
Romania   5  México   9   
Russia   30  Panama   4   
Slovakia   7  Trinidad & Tobago   4   
Ukraine   3  Uruguay   8   
Uzbekistán   1  Venezuela   8   
     Source: www.fitchratings.com 
 
Market pre-requisites 
Many of the ratings they provide are unsolicited and unpaid-for by the banks.  
Nevertheless, it has apparently been profitable for several international ratings firms to 
rate the largest banks in upper-middle-income countries and in the largest of the lower-  12
middle-income countries (for example, Fitch Ratings provide at least some form of rating 
for 439 banks in 50 developing countries - Table 1). By the same token, they may not be 
as well informed about market rumors and intangible measures of management 
performance as could nationals.   The proposed use of rating agencies in (the so-called 
standardized approach to risk-weighting of) Basel risks may well prove to be an 
illustration of reliance on an invalid model of market forces and could even amplify risks 
(Honohan, 2001).   
 
International reputation is also of some (limited) consequence for auditing firms, mainly 




There is a clear link between ratings and required yields on corporate bonds in advanced 
economies.  The evidence on whether the linkage is a causal one is less unambiguous.  
Although some commentators have complained about the rather modest amount of staff 
resources assigned by the major rating agencies to individual companies or banks, there is 
evidence that they can uncover relevant non-public information as embodied in their 
ratings (cf. the evidence already cited by Gropp and Richards for European banks 
suggesting that rating agencies do provide valuable information for stockholders -- 
though not for bondholders).   
 
For developing economies, though, Richards and Deddouche (1999) find that ratings 
changes do not much influence equity prices of banks in developing economies 1991-98.  
If anything there were perverse effects.  They conclude that ratings may not have 
conveyed much information in the sample period, casting some doubt on how useful they 
could be in helping regulators in developing countries.
10   
 
III.  Where Are the Environmental Preconditions in Place? Cross-Country 
Evidence  
 
Thus far, evidence concerning the effectiveness of the various flavors of market 
discipline, though strongly suggestive of a potential role in disciplining bank insiders in 
various contexts, is fragmentary both in terms of country coverage and in terms of the 
channels of effect examined.  That risky banks may pay more for their sources of funds is 
hardly a discovery with earth-shattering policy implications.  That the promulgation of a 
credible official blanket deposit guarantee may weaken this link is by now almost 
axiomatic.  Ideally we would know which particular forms of market discipline are 
materially effective in different institutional environments and whether the adoption of 
                                                 
10 The failure of ratings agencies to provide the slightest hint of several major individual institution failures 
is further illustrative of this perspective.  For example, international analysts Salomon Brothers described 
Brazil’s Banco Nacional in November 1994 as a “strong” bank which they believed would be a “long-term 
winner”; even as late as June 1995, less than five months before the deposit run that precipitated the bank’s 
failure, Salomons recommended the shares as a “hold”.  A December 2002 Fitch report on the Dominican 
Banking System noted robust profitability and struck no note of caution, this just five months before the 
collapse due to fraud of Banco Intercontinental (Baninter) with losses amounting to over US$2 billion or 15% 
of GDP, followed by two other banking failures.   13
discipline-relaxing policy stances makes a material difference. The needed evidence 
relates both to elements of the political and policy environment, which can act as a 
negative, discipline relaxing, force (for example by guaranteeing depositors or 
substituting state ownership for private) and the market and administrative institutional 
requirements (including legal and regulatory requirements).   
 
In this section we show how these environmental aspects, relevant for the effectiveness of 
market discipline, can vary in practice from country to country, and show that although 
some aspects are correlated with GDP per capita, this is not the whole story.   
 
A.  The environment – developing countries look different 
 
Contrasts between developing and advanced economies in the ownership structure of 
banks and other financial service providers, in the degree to which wealth and 
information can be concentrated among a relatively small business elite and the typical 
lack of scale that result in high information acquisition costs by those outside this elite 
group can drastically affect the relative effectiveness of each type of market discipline 
outlined in the previous section.  We can illustrate this point by looking at a handful of 
specific country cases. 
 
Take ownership: the importance of foreign strategic ownership and of government 
ownership varies substantially even for countries at the same overall level of 
development and of financial sophistication and these overall ownership structure issues 
are arguably among the most decisive in determining whether or not market discipline – 
of whatever flavor – is likely to flourish.   
 
Where banks are government-owned, the implicit depositor guarantee is strong, at least to 
the extent that the government itself is considered creditworthy.
11   Banks in developing 
countries that are branches or subsidiaries of banks based in advanced economies will 
typically be subject more to the market discipline of their home country.  Even where 
ownership is based in developing countries, host country market discipline will typically 
take a backseat to market discipline in the home country. 
 
The extent to which many developing country banking systems are dominated by 
government or foreign-controlled banks is not widely recognized.  The World Bank  
Regulation and Supervision Survey asks for data on the market share of majority 
government-owned banks and of majority foreign-owned banks.
12  Analysis of the 
responses reveals that the median share, for developing countries, of these two categories 
taken together is 68.1 percent.  Two in every five developing country banking systems 
have 85% or more in these two categories, and the lower quartile is over 94%.   The 
remainder (31.9% for the median; 15% for two-fifths of countries and 6% for the lower 
quartile) represents an upper bound on the share of the banking system for which it is 
                                                 
11 And this will differ depending on the currency denomination of deposits. 
12 Unless otherwise noted, data on banking, market and regulatory conditions in this and the following 
section is based on preliminary results from the second (2003) wave of the World Bank’s Regulation and 
Supervision Survey in which data for 133 jurisdictions has now been collected.     14
domestic market discipline that is chiefly relevant.  (See Figure 1 and Table 2).  To be 
sure, several of the jurisdictions covered in the survey with mainly foreign-owned banks 
are small offshore centers; nevertheless, the mean population size of countries dominated 
by government-owned and foreign-owned banks is larger than that of the other countries, 
so this is not simply a small country phenomenon. And the true figure for privately-
controlled banks is undoubtedly lower, when account is taken, for example, of (i) banks 
with minority government stakes where the public sector’s total shareholding (including 
other public sector institutions such as social insurance funds and other state-owned 
financial intermediaries) exceeds 50%; (ii) joint venture banks with government and 
foreign partners between them holding more than 50%; and (iii) effective control by 
government or foreign bank albeit with less than 50%.  The relevance of these cases 





Figure 1(a):  Share of banking system not majority controlled by government or foreign banks  
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Figure 1 (b):  Predominant ownership of reporting banking system (percent of reporting 
jurisdictions (Notes:  Mainly government (foreign, private) means more than 60% of total assets 
in this form; Foreign+Government means these two together hold more than 70%.  Equally 










Table 2: Distribution of responding jurisdictions by predominant type of bank ownership 
(Not including high income economies) 
Mainly Govt  Mainly Foreign  Foreign+Govt  Equally Shared  Mainly Local 
Algeria Aruba  Albania  Antigua  Anguilla 
Belarus Bahrain  Montserrat  Argentina  Bolivia 
Bhutan Belize Pakistan  Armenia  Colombia 
Costa Rica  Botswana  Panama  Azerbaijan  El Salvador 
Ecuador  Br. Virgin Is.  Romania  Brazil  Guatemala 
Egypt  Bulgaria  Saint Kitts Nevis  Cameroon  Guyana 
India Côte  d'Ivoire  Uruguay  Chile  Honduras 
Turkmenistan Croatia    Ghana  Lebanon 
 Czech  Republic    Kenya  Liechtenstein 
 Dominica    Kyrgyzstan  Malaysia 
 Estonia    Macedonia  Mauritius 
 Fiji    Moldova  Oman 
 Gambia    Morocco  Philippines 
 Grenada    Peru  Puerto  Rico 
 Guinea    Russia  Rwanda 
  Hungary    Saint Lucia  Serbia & Montenegro 
  Jordan    Saudi Arabia  South Africa 
 Latvia    Suriname  Sudan 
 Lesotho    Tunisia  Thailand 
 Lithuania    Venezuela  Trinidad  &  Tobago 
 Madagascar      Turkey 
 Malta      Ukraine 
 Mexico      Zimbabwe 
 Namibia       
 Poland       
  Saint Vincent        
 Seychelles       
 Slovakia       
 Swaziland       
 Tonga       
 Vanuatu       
Notes:  Mainly government (foreign, private) means more than 60% of total assets in this form; 
Foreign+Government means these two together hold more than 70%.  Equally shared is a residual category.
Source: World Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey  17
  
Several countries are still dominated by state-owned banks.  Examples are China, Egypt 
and Iran.  In China the state-owned banks remain dominant, though a vigorous expansion 
of non-state and foreign-owned banks could erode this dominance over time.  
Nevertheless, the foreign-owned banks are likely to remain niche players, and the 
unrivalled branch network of the state-owned banks means that they are sure to remain 
central for the foreseeable future.  Despite the widely canvassed view that recent 
recapitalizations have been insufficient to bring the true capital adequacy of the banks up 
to regulatory standards, there is an implicit guarantee attached to the state banks – 
probably in this case extending even to their foreign and interbank obligations – that 
greatly limits depositor discipline.  Certainly deposit growth has remained strong and the 
deposit/GDP ratio has continued to grow steadily since the mid-1990s, now reaching 
levels unknown elsewhere (aside from some small offshore financial centers).  
Information agencies can be informative on the underlying strength of the banks; thus, 
although the six internationally rated Chinese state banks reach the sovereign ceiling 
rating for China (reflecting TBTF), the agencies also offer financial strength ratings of 
between D- and E for the state-owned banks.    Any foreign creditors who may distrust 
the implicit government guarantee thus receive a clear message from the ratings agencies. 
As far as the non-state owned national banks are concerned, there might be a weaker 
sense of implicit guarantee.  To be sure, depositors even in the high-profile 1998 failures 
of Gitic and the Hainan Development Bank were made whole as to their capital (though 
other creditors lost out, and apparently not all depositors received all interest due) this has 
not been through either a formal deposit insurance scheme or a national bail-out, but was 
organized at least in part by regional governments.  Moreover, there are reports of 
failures at smaller institutions from which depositors have been unable to recover their 
deposits.  Thus, although most of the nationally-owned banking institutions do have 
public entities as controlling shareholders, there is some scope for depositor discipline.  
Furthermore, several of the city commercial banks have stock market listings and as such 
may be subject to a degree of outside shareholder discipline.  The fact that the state-
owned banks have lost market share to the newcomers can, from the perspective of 
market discipline, be interpreted in different ways.  Most plausibly it suggests weak 
market discipline with regard to prudential aspects: the stronger implicit government 
guarantee counting little against a more attractive package of services provided by 
newcomers. 
 
In Iran, the main banks were nationalized over twenty years ago and operated under 
relatively tight controls lending to the largely state-owned economy.  Their reported 
profitability is very low, and questions have been raised in the media about the adequacy 
of their capital.
13 Only recently have a handful of private banks been licensed and they 
operate on a very small scale.  Likewise, there is no onshore branch or subsidiary 
presence of foreign-owned banks – though there are several representative offices.  An 
implicit government guarantee is understood to hold for all of the banks, at least so far as 
their national obligations are concerned (the six main banks also have relatively sizable 
foreign operations).  Effectively it would appear that all of the possible channels of 
                                                 
13 Although the fact that all banks operate in accordance with Islamic banking principles complicates the 
question of capital ratios, in practice accounting for capital is done on conventional western lines.   18
market discipline are shut in Iran.  But there will evidently be a heightened need for 
market discipline if the relatively recent liberalization of lending is indeed to be followed, 
as is stated policy, by an extensive bank privatization program (there are reports that 
Saderat, one of the large banks, could be fully privatized within months).   
 
Egypt presents a rather different picture, though one that is also in gradual transition.  
Here too, four state-owned commercial banks dominate, with about 60 percent of the 
deposit market and rather less of loans.  Privatization of these four banks is a long-term 
objective, with the authorities relying for the present on having replaced top management 
across the board in order to achieve improvements in efficiency and in lending 
performance.  The remainder of the system is divided fairly equally between (i) those 
controlled by foreign banks; (ii) joint venture banks with majority state-control, though 
having some foreign strategic bank shareholders and (iii) banks without a controlling 
shareholder.  The latter still account for little more than 10 percent of the system, with the 
largest single bank in this category having less than 5 percent. The four state-owned 
banks and a handful of others (see Table 1) are internationally rated (with financial 
strength ratings of between E+ and D+ for the state banks, D+ to C- for the other three).  
13 banks are listed on the stock exchange.  Egypt can thus be seen as on the threshold of 
an era where market monitoring will become both more necessary and possible. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum lie countries such as Mexico, whose banking systems are 
dominated by foreign-controlled banks.  Mexico has seen a rapid ownership 
transformation in the last few years since the Tequila crisis of 1994-95.  Restrictions that 
formerly prevented foreign banks from controlling large banks (any one accounting for 
more than 6% of the system) were removed in 1999.  This unleashed a wave of mergers 
and acquisitions in 2000-2, following which only five big commercial banks now remain, 
and all but one is controlled by a large international bank.  These are Banamex, controlled 
by Citicorp; Bancomer, controlled by Spain’s BBVA; Bital, controlled by HSBC; and 
Serfin, now controlled by Santander.  The Monterrey-based group controlling the fifth, 
Banorte, has a listing and is rated by the international agencies.  The other large banks are 
also rated with support ratings related to their foreign parent’s strength.  Foreign control 
of the commercial banking system, at well over 80 percent, is easily the highest in Latin 
America.  Thus, the role of domestic market discipline is largely confined to a rather 
small segment of the banking system.  Indeed, as is well known, shareholder prudence 
following events of 1994-95 has been reflected in a dramatic shrinkage of credit from the 
banking system: total institutional credit to the nonbank private sector shrank from 62 
percent of GDP in 1994 to 31 percent in 2001, fully accounted for by the fall in bank 
credit alone from 45 percent of GDP to 14 percent. 
 
Interestingly, even in the presence of blanket deposit insurance in the wake of the 1994-
95 banking crisis, there did seem to be some market discipline at work.  As is true in 
many countries, a large share of deposits in Mexico were owned by firms, and many of 
these firms needed to have the assurance that trade credit would be available to them.  
Even if the government guarantee on their deposits should have assured depositors, in 
fact there was anecdotal evidence that some firms began moving their business, deposits 
included, to the stronger banks in order to ensure that their access to trade credit would be   19
there when they needed it.  Although banks can stay open with deposit insurance 
guarantees, if they have a large share of nonperforming loans, they may need to allocate 
an increasing share of new credit to keep these loans current, potentially depriving their 
good clients of access to finance when they need it. 
 
There still are, of course, a significant number of developing countries where nationally-
owned or widely held banks dominate the system.  Examples here would be Argentina 
and Lebanon.   
 
Argentina’s banking system is an intermediate case with government, foreign banks, and 
local concerns, controlling roughly equal shares of the system. Famous for having 
introduced such regulatory innovations as a requirement for banks to issue subordinated 
debt to independent institutional shareholders, as well as for the dramatic collapse of the 
fixed exchange rate system, Argentina’s banking system has, as mentioned, previously 
been examined for evidence of market discipline in deposits.  Data on the average interest 
rate paid, as well as on the market share of the largest twelve banks in Argentina does 
not, however, reveal either a clear pattern of higher interest rates, or a loss of deposits, by 
those banks reporting higher loan-delinquency experience in the months running up to the 
collapse of the system in 2001 (cf. Martinez-Peria and Schmukler, 2003).  This tends to 
confirm that the collapse was a systemic one, driven largely by macroeconomic and 
government induced factors, rather than by deficient management of individual banks. 
 
Essentially all of Lebanon’s banks are privately owned (though it is interesting to find 
that the fourth largest, Banque de la Mediterranee is owned by a holding company 
understood
14 to be owned by the current prime minister, Rafik Hariri).  Despite recent 
consolidation the market is not concentrated and has a Herfindahl index of about 600 
(indicating concentration equivalent to the market being divided among 16 equal-sized 
banks).  Four of the six largest banks are understood to be controlled by local families.  
The largest foreign-controlled bank is the fifth ranked Banque-Libano Francaise, of 
which 51% is owned by Indosuez of France.  In total, there are ten other foreign-owned 
banks – three of them in the top ten by assets – of which six from Arab countries.  Five of 
the banks, including three of the five largest,  have a listing on the Beirut stock exchange.  
Additionally three of the largest banks have issued GDRs, and these GDRs have in turn 
been listed in Beirut (in one case even though the bank in question does not have a 
primary listing there, see Box).  Preference shares have also been issued and sold across-
the-counter by four large banks and the three largest have also issued ten-year 
subordinated bonds denominated in US dollars and listed in London or Luxembourg.  
Here, then is an economy where the main channels of market discipline are open, both for 
domestic investors and depositors as well as an important potential role for foreign 
investors in the GDRs and externally listed debt of the banks.  The relatively high 
monetization of the Lebanese economy, including sizable deposits by non-residents and 
temporary expatriates from Lebanon, and the high degree of deposit dollarization, which 
has remained around two-thirds of the total for several years, despite the fixed peg with 
the US dollar maintained through this period, suggests that deposit holdings are well 
                                                 
14 This and other ownership indications about Lebanese banking are drawn mainly from analyst reports by 
rating agency Capital Intelligence.   20
above the minimum transactions balances and as such depositors will tend to be alert to 
warning signs.  There is a deposit insurance scheme, but its coverage (about USD 3300) 
and assets (about 1.4% of total banking assets) are relatively small, and payout in the past 
has been slow.  More to the point, the degree to which implicit deposit insurance applies 
on a large scale is limited by the consideration that the government is by far the largest 
creditor of the banking system.  Yet, with a population of just 4 million Lebanon is a 
small country with a small elite business community and, despite their impressive 
performance, its banks too are small, limiting the resources which rating agencies can 
justify expending when researching their ratings.  
 
B.  Preconditions – By flavor of discipline and income level 
 
We can attempt to quantify some of the preconditions for market monitoring, using in 
particular data from the second (2003) wave of the World Bank’s regulatory survey (of 
which the first wave results are discussed in Barth et al, 2001, 2003) and combining this 
with other sources of information.  We begin with updated information on the overall 
“private sector monitoring” index proposed by Barth, Caprio and Levine and 
summarizing the extent to which the private sector is empowered to exercise market 
discipline.  This private sector monitoring index  captures elements of the preconditions 
for each of the flavors of market discipline we have discussed.
15   
 
Figure 2: Private Monitoring index and (a) predominant type of ownership; (b) per capita income 
level (PPP)  
(Source: World Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey; for definition of predominant type of 
ownership see note to Table 2) 
 
                                                 
15 The methodology for computing the summary index of private monitoring is as described in Barth, 
Caprio and Levine, 2001.  As such it covers bank accounting rules, auditing and disclosure requirements, 
rating of banks, deposit insurance and subordinated debt. 
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Unsurprisingly, we find that this index is higher, the higher the fraction of the banking 
system that is in local private hands (Figure 2a).  In other words, those countries that have 
predominantly government-owned or foreign-owned banking systems have lower values 
of this index.  This can be seen as fitting, to the extent that their banks don’t need local 
market discipline.  On the other hand, there is no apparent correlation between the market 
monitoring index and per capita income (Figure 2b).  Yes, the high income economies 
have a higher average value than the developing countries as a group, but within the 
latter, the average value actually declines as one moves from the lowest income 
categories.  Overall, then, data for the private sector monitoring index does not suggest a 
systematic tendency for the preconditions for market discipline to be more absent at 
lower income categories. 
 
Barth, Caprio and Levine (2003) found that the private monitoring index was negatively 
correlated with a variety of measures of banking risk.  Here we use just one additional 
(inverse) measure of risk, De Nicoló’s Z (cf De Nicoló et al., 2003).  This is computed for 
each country as the average ratio for the largest banks of accounting capital to the 
standard deviation of bank earnings. The bivariate correlation between the private 
monitoring index and the risk measure Z is quite strong (see Table 5, equation 1.1 
below—lower values of Z imply higher risk), though the relation is not very robust as 
will be shown below. 
 
More speculatively, we can attempt to isolate components of the environment that are 
particularly relevant to each of the main flavors of market discipline.  Table 3 proposes 
an allocation.  For example, the key variable for depositor monitoring is absence of 
official depositor protection.  As indicated in the Table 3, depositor discipline would also 
be particularly facilitated by a better information environment among the largest 
depositors, here crudely approximated by population size (the smaller the better).  
Likewise, better accounts, and accountability of bank management
16 is also assigned as 
likely to be particularly relevant to depositor monitoring of bank management.   
 
Turning to discipline by equity and bond holders, the percentage of private banks that are 
listed will be especially important.  Finally, for information specialists to be effective, it 
will be necessary for the banks to be rated (we count how many of the largest ten banks 
are rated) and for adequate auditing requirements (we measure this by asking if external 
audit by a certified auditor is compulsory).   
 
The mean values for these variables, as measured using data from the Regulation Survey, 
are shown in Figures 3 and 4 and in Table 4.   
 
Using data on these variables in regressions explaining allocation, we note that the key 
specific preconditions for depositor discipline and that provided by equity holders are 
again correlated with Z and with the correct sign (Table 5, regressions 1.2 and 1.3).  The 
presence of a formal deposit insurance scheme is used for depositor discipline, and an 
                                                 
16 Here measured by an index whose value is higher depending on whether interest accrued but unpaid is 
excluded from bank earnings, whether consolidation of group accounts is required, and whether bank 
directors are legally liable for misleading information   22
approximate
17 share of the privately-owned banking system that has a stock exchange 
listing for the equity holders.  On the other hand, the number of rated banks is not 
significant (regression 1.4), in line with our expectation that the role of specialized 
information firms may be a weaker channel, especially for a sample that includes such a 
high proportion of developing countries.  Of the available proxies other institutional 
indicators proposed in Table 3, only the size variable (population) proves to be significant 
(Table 5, regression 1.7) and it has the expected sign: small countries performing better. 
 
It needs to be noted, of course, that these bivariate correlations are not very robust, and as 
such can be taken as suggestive only.  This is not surprising, given the very indirect 
character of the proxies employed.  In particular, GNP per capita is an even stronger 
(inverse) predictor of banking risk (Table 5, regression 2.2), and it displaces the private 
sector monitoring index – though this remains close to significant at the 10 percent level 
when included.
18  More important, there is no evidence of an interactive term (Table 5, 
regressions 2.3 and 2.5): there is no indication of a systematically different private sector 
monitoring index is equally effective in reducing risk in rich and poor countries.   
 
Table 3:  Suggested assignment of preconditions to different sources of discipline 
Type of precondition: 
 
Source of discipline 
Market and administrative 
institutions 
Political and policy stance 
Depositors  Accountability of bank management  
Size of country (small) 
Deposit protection (low) 
Equity and bond holders  Percentage of private banks listed  Government ownership share (low) 
Information firms  Number of banks rated   
Auditing requirements 
Foreign ownership share (high) 
 
Table 4:  Indicators of selected preconditions by income level 
(Developing countries, mean values) 
Income level  <$2500  $2500-$5000  $5000-$8000  >$8000 
Accountability of bank management  2.71 2.72 2.72 2.91 
Small size of country  11 8 10 4 
Percentage of private banks listed   0.33 0.45 0.50 0.69 
Number of banks rated    0.6 3.8 2.0 4.1 
Auditing requirements  0.72 0.78 0.63 0.82 
No deposit protection  0.56 0.26 0.32 0.09 
Government ownership share  0.09 0.29 0.25 0.13 
Foreign ownership share  0.43 0.33 0.46 0.52 
Note: For definition of variables employed see note to Table 5.   
Source: World Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey, except income level (measured in PPP, 2001) and 
size (population in millions): World Development Indicators. 
 
 
                                                 
17Because of issues of aggregation and double counting, this measure is a fairly rough approximation.  See 
note to Table 4 for its construction. 
18 Several authors (La Porta et al. 1999, Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2001) have previously noted the 
difficulties presented by including GNP per capita, potentially an endogenous variable, in regressions along 
with determinants of banking risk.  Clearly there is a risk that the independent role of such determinants as 
the private monitoring index could be masked by such inclusion.   23
Assessing the degree to which these preconditions are satisfied in different countries, it 
proves not to be the case that the preconditions are systematically less present in poorer 
countries.  
 
Take depositor discipline.  As already mentioned, depositors do require basic disclosures 
of accounting information and for the bank managers to be accountable for the accuracy 
of this information.  Our summary variable for bank management accountability
19  can 
vary from 0 to 3, though most countries score 2 or 3, and we find (Figure 3) that the 
variation of the mean value here by countries in different income classes is relatively 
small, going from 2.71 in the lowest quartile of developing countries to 2.77 in high 
income countries (upper middle-income countries score highest: 2.91 on this measure).  
Additionally however, there is the point that informal sources of depositor information 
are likely to be much better where the number of large depositors, whether individual or 
corporate, is small (cf. the Scottish analogy, above).  While we do not have systematic 
data on the number of large depositors for many of our sample countries, it is clearly an 
offsetting positive factor that strengthens potential depositor discipline in the poorer 
countries on average.  The negative pre-requisite is the absence of deposit protection.  
Using the simple existence of an explicit deposit insurance scheme as a proxy for this, we 
find that fewer of the poor countries have such schemes and to that extent the negative 
preconditions are more often present in poor countries (Figure 3). 
 
Turning to discipline by debt and outside equity holders, considering the availability of 
stock market listings to be an indicator of one precondition for this kind of discipline, we 
see (Figure 3) that the estimated share of total banking assets in listed entities does seem 
to increase as income levels go up, and indeed there is a significant positive correlation 
(R=0.27) between this index and per capita GNP. However, when the percentage of total 
assets in listed firms is expressed as a proportion of banking assets not in government or 
foreign bank hands, the correlation becomes insignificant (R=0.18).  Once more, then, the 
positive preconditions are not systematically weaker in poor countries. 
 
The role of rating agencies does appear to be greater in rich countries.  The number of 
rated banks increases significantly with per capita income, even when normalized by the 
share of non-government, non-foreign bank-owned banks in the system. 
 
*  *  * 
                                                 
19 This again follows the definition of Barth, Caprio and Levine and includes treatment of interest accrued 
but not received, existence of consolidated accounting for groups and legal liability of directors.   24
Figure 3:  Selected indicators of market discipline preconditions by per capita income 
level (PPP), group means  





Thus, when the data, fragmentary though it is, is interpreted through this prism, we can 
find surprisingly little evidence of systematic difference in the extent to which most 
positive and negative prerequisites for market discipline are present as between poor and 
rich, large and small countries.  To be sure, systemic crises caused by macroeconomic, 
exchange rate or fiscal instability tend to swamp the discriminating function of the market 
as between banks that are soundly-run and the rest, and these events are more prevalent in 
poor and small economies.  
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Figure 4:  Selected indicators of market discipline preconditions by predominant 
ownership of banks, group means 
 
(Source: World Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey; for definition of predominant type of 
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Table 5: Regression results 
(i)  Correlation of banking risk with the preconditions for different flavors of market discipline 
Equation: 1.1   1.2  1.3 1.4 1.5  1.6 1.7  
Dependent var.  Bank risk Z  Bank risk Z  Bank risk Z  Bank risk Z  Bank risk Z  Bank risk Z  Bank risk Z 
Explanatory var.  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff. t-Stat  Coeff. t-Stat  Coeff. t-Stat  Coeff. t-Stat  Coeff. t-Stat  Coeff. t-Stat 
Constant  -1.77  1.3      2.63  8.9*** 1.70  3.3*** 2.35  3.4*** 1.04  0.6  6.02  2.5**  3.84  8.5***
Private  monitoring  index  0.712  3.4***              
No  deposit  insurance    1.26  2.1**            
Listed  %  of  pvt  banks      2.35  2.6**          
Number  banks  rated        0.115  1.2        
Bank  accounts          0.680  1.1      
Auditing            -3.12  -1.3    
Population  size  (log)              -0.374  2.4** 
R-squared  /  NOBS  0.125  85 0.052  85 0.082  76 0.029  48 0.015  49 0.020  48 0.066  85 
Adjusted  R-squared 0.114   0.040   0.070   0.008   0.003   0.008   0.054   
S.E.  of  regr./DW  2.27 1.95 2.36 1.81 2.38 1.72 2.57 1.23 2.42 1.83 2.40 1.81 2.34 1.64 
Log likel./Method  -189.1  LS  -192.6  LS  -172.8  LS -112.3  LS -192.3  LS -194.0  LS -191.9  LS 
 
 
(ii)  Interaction of index of private market discipline with per capita income and ownership structure in affecting banking risk 
Equation: 2.1   2.2 2.3 2.4  2.5  2.6  
Dependent var.  Bank risk Z  Bank risk Z  Bank risk Z  Bank risk Z  Bank risk Z  Bank risk Z 
Explanatory var.  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat Coeff.  t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff.  t-Stat Coeff.  t-Stat 
Constant  -1.77  1.3 1.64  4.2***  -0.543  0.4 1.613  4.2***  2.12  0.8 1.03  2.0* 
Private Monitoring Index  0.712  3.4***      0.359  1.6      -0.058  0.1     
GNP  per  cap  (x  100)    0.817  3.5***  0.708  3.0***    -1.154  0.7  0.652  2.4** 
PvtMon  x  GNP  p.c.        0.124  4.0***  0.281  1.2    
PvtMon  x  Privatebanks            0.243  2.0* 
R-squared  /  NOBS  0.125  85 0.138  80 0.167  80 0.169  80 0.181  80 0.168  72 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.114   0.127   0.141   0.159   0.149   0.144   
S.E.  of  regr./DW  2.27 1.95 2.17 1.46 2.19 1.45 2.14 1.44 2.15 1.44 2.22 1.38 
Log  likel./Method  -189.1 LS  174.7 LS  -168.1 LS  -173.3 LS  -172.7 LS  -158.1  
Note: The dependent variable bank risk is measured by De Nicoló’s Z, which is the average for banks in each country of each 
bank’s return on assets plus accounting capital all divided by the standard deviation of returns (cf. De Nicoló et al, 2003).  Data 
kindly provided by Gianni de Nicoló. 
Except where mentioned, the explanatory variables are zero-one dummies based on the second (2003) wave of the World Bank’s 
Regulation and Supervision Survey, and employing essentially the same definitions as proposed by Barth, Caprio and Levine 
(2001).  Private Monitoring Index is the composite private monitoring index discussed in the text. “No deposit insurance” is 
coded “0” if there is an explicit insurance system and that depositors were wholly compensated (to the extent of legal protection) 
the last time a bank failed; coded “1” otherwise.  “Listed % of pvt banks” is an approximation to the share of the privately-
owned part of the banking system consisting of banks with a stock market listing.  It is a composite indicator based on data from 
three sources: it divides the aggregate assets of listed banks and bank holding companies (source Bankscope)  by the percentage 
of total banking assets (source IFS), and  expresses the result as a percentage of the share of non-government and non-state-
owned banks in total banking assets from the Regulation Survey.  “Number banks rated” is the number among the largest ten 
banks which is rated by an international rating agency. “Bank accounts” ranges from 0 to 3 depending on whether interest 
accrued but unpaid is excluded from bank earnings, whether consolidation of group accounts is required, and whether bank 
directors are legally liable for misleading information.  “Auditing” means external audit by a certified auditor is compulsory.  
Private Banks is the percentage share of banking assets in  banks that are not owned by government or by foreign banking 
groups.  GNP per cap is Gross National Product per capita in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms, hundreds of US dollars; 
population size is in  millions; both 2001, source: World Development Indicators.  Two cross product terms with the Private 
Monitoring Index (PvtMon) are also employed. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   27
IV. Improving  Market  Discipline 
 
Regardless of how well market discipline works in developing countries, available 
evidence suggests that an approach based on official supervision has no significant 
impact on financial sector development, on the likelihood that the financial system would 
not be affected by crises, or on the access to credit by firms (Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 
2003; and Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2003).  Indeed, these studies have 
suggested that except in environments with well-developed political checks and balances 
and a highly independent media, improving supervisory powers actually had a negative 
impact on these variables.  Only in extremely advanced institutional settings, with highly 
developed  checks and balances and media independence  were broader supervisory 
powers linked with more positive outcomes.   
 
Many have posited that supervision can only work if the supervisor is highly 
independent.  Empirical evidence on the importance of de jure independence within the 
government (captured by the ability of administration to remove the supervisor 
unilaterally) and of independence from the industry being regulated (measured by the 
extent to which supervisors were protected, at least on paper, from bearing the expense of 
civil lawsuits and from criminal prosecution for doing their job) both are quite mixed.  
We suspect that it is not the case that these factors do not matter but rather that it is 
difficult to capture true independence especially in the former sense from what is written 
on paper.  Even countries in which the de jure independence of the bank supervisor is 
high, it is plausible that the de facto independence is low where a relatively small number 
of economic groups or families control a large share of the economy.  In these cases, the 
press also might be captured or even directly controlled by the same narrow group of 
interests.
20  To be sure, in such environments, markets may not function as well as they 
might in economies with more arms-length relationships, but they still appear to be 
capable of having some impact in monitoring banks.  Still, efforts should continue both to 
better understand the institutional prerequisites for effective bank supervision and to 
advance the cause of institutional development in these areas.  However, given that 
evidence indicates that market discipline can be effective, then it also makes sense for 
authorities to focus on how to make it work even better. 
 
Instead, much regulatory attention appears to the influenced by the debate regulatory 
choices in developed countries, where the emphasis is very much been put on bank 
capital and on requiring supervisors to take prompt corrective actions in the event of 
banking distress.  Table 5 compares indicators of bank regulation and supervision  from 
the first World Bank survey, with most observations from 1998 or 1999,  and the second 
survey, which was taken in early 2003.   Focusing on the original 107 countries 
responding in the first survey,  this table shows the responses grouped by countries at 
different income levels.   
 
                                                 
20  In fact, one of the authors of this paper visited a country in which a family controlling one of the most 
important domestically-owned banks and a number of holding companies also had a family member as 
head of bank supervision. This by the way was in a situation in which the limit on family control of a bank 
was only 5% of total equity.   28
The changes that stand out the most are for the low-income countries, where there has 
been an significant increase in the stringency of capital regulations and the overall index 
of capital regulation, a slight decline in official supervisory powers, but a substantial 
jump in prompt corrective action powers.
21  Interestingly, low-income country 
supervisors’ discretion to forbear actually increased somewhat – in other words, they 
have the ability to take prompt corrective action powers, but are not as constrained as 
they were previously.  The one supervisory variable that was found by BCL to have some 
positive impact on the development of the financial sector and on limiting the occurrence 
of banking crises, namely requirements that banks diversify their risks, actually decreased 
in all the countries, including in the low-income countries, where small economic size 
and insufficient diversification could be a critical issue.    Thus it would appear all the 
more important for authorities to try to strengthen market discipline.   Unfortunately, 
according to the survey,  the private monitoring index has decreased somewhat.  Part of 
this decline reflects some spreading of deposit insurance (the absence of which raises this 
index).              
 
Table 6. Trends in Bank Regulation and Supervision 
Surveys carried out in 1998-99 (Survey I) and 2003 (Survey II) 








Survey I  3.92  3.29  3.12  3.11 
Overall Capital Stringency          
Survey II  3.79  3.45  3.09  4.40 
Survey I  5.61  5.05 4.42 4.47 
Capital Regulation Index  
Survey II  5.45  5.23  4.70  5.60 
Survey I  10.79  11.33 11.19 11.37 
Official Supervisory Power 
Survey II  10.39  10.36  10.48  10.90 
Survey I  1.49  2.71 1.85 2.47 
Prompt Corrective Action  
Survey II  1.63  3.00  2.39  4.10 
Survey I  1.87  1.29  1.38 1.72  Supervisory Forbearance 
Discretion   Survey II  1.75  1.55  1.17  1.40 
Survey I  1.92  2.10 2.00 1.68 
Liquidity / Diversification Index 
Survey II  1.55  1.55  1.13  1.20 
Survey I  7.08  7.10 6.73 5.47 
Private Monitoring Index  
Survey II  6.87  6.36  6.04  5.40 
Note: In each case, the higher value as between the two surveys is shown in bold.  Countries are classified 
by income level into High, Upper-middle, Lower-middle and Low income using standard World 
Development Indicators classifications, 2003. 
Source: World Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey 
                                                 
21 Official supervisory powers, as disaggregated by Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001) cover a broad array of 
powers, some related to the ability to implement prompt corrective action, others at supervisors’ ability to 
force restructuring and reorganization, or to declare insolvency.    29
 
 
What does it take to make for better market discipline?  Consider the four sources of 
market discipline for banking, noted above: depositors, debt holders, outside equity 
holders, and information specialists.  First, all of them require accurate and timely 
information to do the best possible job.  This means that regulations or listing 
requirements that necessitate prompt and thorough disclosure of key information relevant 
to determining bank performance clearly are to be encouraged.  What types of 
information most need to be disclosed, beyond the standard balance sheet and income 
statement data?   
 
Certainly there is a case to be made that information on the state of a bank’s loan 
portfolio, and more broadly the credit risk that it has, would be useful for creditors, 
shareholders, and competitors.  Some voluntary disclosure is valuable to banks, both 
lowering their cost of funds and the volatility of their equity price (Baumann and Nier, 
2003).  However, there is a clear externality – individual banks are not rewarded for 
reducing the volatility or funding costs of their competitors – and therefore will not 
disclose sufficiently credit risk information.  If banks were forced to mark their portfolios 
to market, reporting requirements would be far easier.  The absence of this practice –  due 
no doubt to its difficulty, and the related nontradeability of much bank debt --  means that 
a significant amount of information pertaining to credit, market, and operational risks of 
banks is required in order to make a reasonable estimate of their health.   
 
One piece of critical information that does not get adequately disclosed (and which would 
greatly benefit both share and debt holders of banks) is the compensation structure of 
bank management.  The market really needs to be able to understand the extent to which 
it is risktaking or prudence that is being rewarded.  Banks and other firms surely will 
resist such disclosure, but compensation structures should be factoring into either 
minimum capital requirements and/or the price charged by the market for outside 
funding. 
 
As became clear in recent scandals in the United States, it is important that information 
specialists, such as rating agencies and auditors, are acting at arm's length from the 
clients whose information they are certifying.  In addition to occasionally discussed  
proposals to make these actors liable for their opinions, it is possible for a regulatory 
body at the very least to publish their track records, such as the number of times that a 
client receiving a favorable view from the agency in question has subsequently, within 
some short time period, developed problems.  There is a difference of opinion as to 
whether these agencies should have their activities restricted, e.g. preventing accounting 
firms who audit a company from picking up other consulting business.  But what needs to 
be disclosed is not only where such relationships exist, but also the compensation 
structure for the officers of the accounting firm.  This needs to include not just the level 
of compensation, but importantly the formula that determines it.  Such a disclosure would 
have flagged serious incentive problems at Arthur Andersen, the auditor of Enron and 
other failed companies.   It would also likely help augment market discipline from 
information specialists.   30
 
In addition to information that is required by government regulation, available 
information also depends on the incentives that banks have to release it, and that others 
have to report it.  For example, in the United States prior to the adoption of deposit 
insurance, there used to be daily and weekly newspapers that followed the performance 
of bank notes issued by various commercial banks.  There was a market for this reporting 
because the holders of these notes understood that they were subject to losses.   
 
Second, beyond the information that is available, it follows that markets need the 
incentive to act.  As suggested by studies referred to earlier, depositors’ incentives to 
monitor the health of the banks in which they put their money is reduced to the extent 
that they are credibly insured, and the greater is this insurance.  Perhaps the best 
illustration of this was the study by Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2004), which found 
that in countries with explicit deposit insurance, banks that were expanding their lending 
portfolio rapidly did not pay much of the increased cost for their funds, whereas in 
countries without explicit deposit insurance, the cost of funds rose smartly as banks 
attempted to expand.  Moreover, most developing countries that offer deposit insurance 
appear to underprice it substantially (Laeven, 2002), and a number have exceptionally 
generous deposit insurance ceilings, with some even offering blanket deposit insurance 
for all deposits.   Scaling back deposit insurance coverage, thereby increasing the share of 
deposits that are not insured, should increase monitoring by those uninsured, while still 
protecting small depositors, who in most cases possess little comparative advantage in 
monitoring banks.  Thus deposit insurance ceilings of about one to two times per capita 
GDP – about the norm in higher income countries -- likely have little cost in reducing the 
effective degree of market monitoring that is conducted.   
 
Moreover, the generous availability of deposit insurance may convince debtholders that 
the authorities are reluctant to allow anyone to suffer losses, and without the fear of 
losses is not likely that debtholders will invest in monitoring banks.  Thus it is important, 
in order to improve market monitoring, that authorities send strong and consistent signals 
that uninsured debtholders will not have their losses covered by the government.   
 
In addition to increasing the likelihood that debtholders might face losses is the need to 
increase in the preponderance of bank liabilities in the form of uninsured debt.  Even if 
all other features of a deposit insurance scheme appear to be well designed, an 
excessively low price for that insurance will encourage an expansion of insured deposit 
liabilities relative to total liabilities.  If banks bear the costs of deposit insurance premia, 
then a high price will make them reluctant to raise insured deposits and more eager to 
raise uninsured debt.  On the other hand if banks passed on the cost of deposit insurance 
premia to the ultimate deposit holders, then potential depositors will themselves prefer to 
hold non-deposit debt.  Subordinated debt proposals (see Kaufman, 2003; Calomiris, 
1999, Evanoff and Wall, 2001) have in common requirements that banks issue junior 
debt in relatively large lumps, in order to avoid the free rider problem that is thought to 
limit monitoring by small depositors.  The complaint that banks find subordinated debt 
costly to issue may be biased by the subsidy associated with generous deposit insurance   31
schemes; in other words subordinated debt certainly is costly relative to insured deposits 
with a hefty government subsidy built into the insurance premium. 
 
An additional benefit of taking steps to increase market monitoring is that it is 
complementary with effective bank supervision.  For example, recall the environment 
suggested above, in which a few families or powerful interest groups control a large 
segment of the economy.  These interest groups will find it in their interest to try to 
influence government supervision.  However, to the extent that they are forced to disclose 
data that may indicate certain problems in their banks, ‘countervailing powers,’ including 
pressure on political authorities to insure that appropriate actions are taken may arise.  
Such pressure is more likely to the extent that there is at least some part of the media or 
the electorate that is well informed about and understands financial sector issues. 
Requirements that supervisors take actions in certain situations may be helpful as well, 
but if the vested interests are sufficiently powerful and there is no offsetting interest 
group pushing in the other direction, then attempts to ensure prompt corrective action 
may fail.  Indeed, such pressures may explain why Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2003) 
found no evidence that greater supervisory powers had beneficial effects on the financial 
sector. 
   
As has been suggested before, one of the benefits of mandatory subordinated debt 
issuance by banks is that the price of this debt will tell supervisors which banks need 
more of their attention.  In the case of Argentina, it was said that the thinness of the debt 
market prevented it from revealing significant information.  Still, the inability of some 
banks to comply with subordinated debt requirements predicted quite well which banks 
needed supervisory intervention, and certainly was associated clearly with the level of 
nonperforming loans (Calomiris-Powell, 2001).  As noted in the case of the United 
States, it seems that the primary issuance market is the most significant, and thus the lack 
of a well-developed secondary market should serve as no obstacle to enhancing market 





Market discipline on banks can help alert regulators to risky or self-serving behavior by 
bank insiders; it can also act directly on insider incentives.  But market discipline is 
unlikely to emerge in the absence of relevant market and information infrastructures, and 
where explicit or implicit government guarantees stifle the incentive for depositors, debt-
and outside equity-holders, or information specialists to exercise such discipline. 
 
The widespread belief that market discipline on managers and controlling shareholders of 
privately-owned banks cannot be effective in less developed financial environments was 
questioned.  For one thing, many of the privately owned banks in the developing world 
are foreign-owned.  As such, the foreign private sector in the home countries – typically 
more developed – of these banks, will also be exercising discipline.  Besides, the quality 
and relevance of information available to large depositors on the probity and skills of 
local bank management is arguably higher in less sophisticated settings—and relatively   32
higher than that available to official regulators.  In general, we find more reason to think 
that market discipline works certainly better in lower-income countries than pre-existing 
beliefs generally held.  Countries should build on any success in this area by limiting the 
role of explicit deposit guarantees, reducing state ownership of banks where it is 
prevalent, and by not putting all their eggs in the supervisory basket.  Greater disclosure, 
for example, of how risk taking is rewarded and how rating agencies earn their fees 
would support the development of better market monitoring.  More broadly, it seems that 
greater emphasis on the third pillar in the Basel II Accord than on the refinements of the 
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Box: Subordinated debt of a Lebanese bank – tracking the government or the bank? 
 
Examining the prices of tradable debt and equity of Lebanon’s largest bank BLOM is 
instructive as to the potential and limitations of secondary bond and equity markets for 
privately-owned banks in a lower middle-income economy. BLOM is effectively 
controlled by a group of 5 families, who between them control over 30 percent of the 
shares.  A further 23 percent are traded as depository receipts (GDR).  The bank has 13 
percent of the Lebanese market and reported US$7.1 billion in total assets ($6 billion in 
deposits) at end 2002.  Shareholders’ fund in the bank are about $0.6 billion and its end-
2002 market value of the equity was about $1.4 billion.  Thus BLOM is only a modestly 
sized bank by advanced economy standards.  Its 10-year subordinated US-dollar 
denominated note (coupon 9%, maturing 2005) is traded in Beirut and Luxembourg.  The 
GDRs are also traded in Beirut and Luxembourg.   
 
We show charts comparing the yield on the subordinated debt to the GDR price and to 
the yield on a Government of Lebanon eurobond with approximately the same coupon 
and maturity (8¾%, 2005). 
22 The charts are plotted in transaction  time; that is to say, the 
only dates shown are those on which there was a transaction in one or both of the assets; 
the price shown is the price of that day’s transaction or, for a security not traded on that 
day, the price at the last transaction.  The period covered is April 2002 to September 
2003.  This was a dramatic period in the fortunes of the Lebanon financial markets. In the 
period before November 2002, a difficult fiscal environment caused capital outflows, a 
sharp fall foreign exchange reserves of the central bank and the spread on Government of 
Lebanon eurobonds widening to more than 1100 basis points.  The grant of substantial 
concessionary funding by the French Government and other donors at a conference in 
Paris on November 23, 2002 resulted in a sharp narrowing of the spread by about 400 
basis points, as seen in Figure A.2.  The Beirut equity market also recovered and the 
central bank’s foreign exchange reserves have subsequently been amply replenished. 
 
The fortunes of BLOM bank are, of course, not unrelated to the fiscal situation in 
Lebanon.  For one thing, over a third of the bank’s assets are held in Lebanese 
Government obligations.  Thus it is not surprising to see (in Figure A.1) the bank’s equity 
appreciating by about 40 percent from November 2002 to July 2003 (international bank 
equity trends would also be a factor here).  The yield on the bank’s debt also declines 
from November 2002 on. Nevertheless, we see from Figure A.2 that the yield on BLOM 
debt did not closely track the sovereign eurobond during the period of pressure.  Even 
though transactions were few, it seems that BLOM bank debt continued to yield less than 
9 percent during the summer of 2002, while sovereign debt yielded almost 13½ percent.  
However, after the Paris aid package,  the bank bond tracks the eurobond fairly closely, 
                                                 
22 The debt yields are shown both in absolute terms and as spreads over a US Treasury bond of comparable 
maturity.   38
with the yield spread ranging from minus 83 to plus 71 basis points and averaging just 2 
basis points. 
  
The charts suggest a few considerations about the use of bank debt and equity prices for 
inferring market discipline.  For example: 
 
−  The debt and equity of even relatively small banks are increasingly traded in 
international markets.  It is potentially an international market that exercises 
discipline through these capital market instruments. 
 
−  The markets are rather inactive (if the trades reported in Bloombergs, on which 
the figures are based, are comprehensive), and as such do not necessarily give 
very up-to-date information about market expectations.  Bloomberg’s report no 
trades in either the sovereign eurobond nor the bank’s sub debt from July 2002 to 
the end of October 2002.   
 
−  Given the lack of depth in the markets, care should be taken in inferring 
movements in bank-specific default risk from asset price movements; 
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks are a more likely cause of asset price movements 
for a well-capitalized bank such as BLOM.  (Examination of the data on two other 
bank bonds – available only in 2003 and not shown here – confirms this point: the 
yields have a strong comovement, yet also experience swings of up to 100 basis 
points, strongly suggest the result of liquidity trading.) 
 
−  There may be no robust reference price against which to compare the asset prices 
in order to infer movements in default risk. When the spread of a bank’s debt over 
the sovereign is a negative 350 basis points, movements in the yield are as likely 
to reflect a changing perceptions of how sovereign risk should be factored into the 
prices of a bank’s assets.  
 
−  It might be possible for insiders to manipulate market prices of inactively traded 
debt by effecting small artificial transactions from time to time.  Perhaps the 400 
basis point reverse spread on the bank bond in mid-2002 does not reflect market 















Figure A.1 Yield on BLOM Bank Global Depository Receipt & BLOM 9% Subordinated 
Debt, 2005 
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Figure A.2:  Yields on Lebanese Government 8.75% Eurobond, 2005 and BLOM Bank 
9% Subordinated Debt, 2005 
Transactions dates April 2002-September 2003. 
Lebanon: Govt and Bank Bonds















































































































































Lebanon: Bank and Government Debt
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